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Moreover, among other statements, BR argue that the quasi-stationary ( i.e., no-wave) limit of electrodynamics is unsuited for information transfer, thus implying that this (required) assumption for (perfect) security of the KLJN system is unphysical. They attempt to prove this claim by showing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with nothing but two batteries and two switches. Bennett and Riedel (BR) assert that thermodynamics is not essential in the KLJN scheme and argue that it does not provide security. Very recently, QKD's co-founder Charles Bennett co-authored a manuscript with Jess Riedel wherein they present an extensive criticism of the KLJN scheme and deny its security under idealized conditions. Since 1984, quantum key distribution (QKD) has been claimed to possess unconditional security and much later, in 2005, an alternative based on classical physics, known as the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme, appeared as a competing approach. Information theoretic ( i.e., unconditional) security means that the stated security level-either perfect or imperfect, as in any physical system -holds even for cases when the abilities of an eavesdropper (generally called “Eve”) are limited only by the laws of physics. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.

We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) ( ) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme.